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Abstract: Complex network theory is a useful way to study many real systems. In this paper, an 
anti-attack model based on complex network theory is introduced. The mechanism of this model is 
based on dynamic compensation process and reverse percolation process in P2P networks. The main 
purpose of the paper is: (i) a dynamic compensation process can turn an attacked P2P network into a 
power-law (PL) network with exponential cutoff; (ii) a local healing process can restore the maximum 
degree of peers in an attacked P2P network to a normal level; (iii) a restoring process based on reverse 
percolation theory connects the fragmentary peers of an attacked P2P network together into a giant 
connected component. In this way, the model based on complex network theory can be effectively 
utilized for anti-attack and protection purposes in P2P networks. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks become a very active research area 
due to its advantages over traditional Client/Server model for application scenarios 
such as file sharing, distributed computing, collaborative applications, and immediate 
communication [1-6]. However, they are vulnerable to many malicious peers for the 
open and unreliable nature of most P2P networks. For example, in P2P file sharing 
systems, malicious peers can spread untrustworthy and potentially harmful files to the 
system if no security measure is used [1]. And the same situation happens in distributed 
computing systems [2], an attacked computer can affect many other computers’ normal 
operations. For these reasons, during the process of gaining service from P2P 
networks, how to resist attacks in the study of P2P networks becomes more and more 
important. 
In order to avoid being attacked in P2P networks, there are mainly two kinds of 
anti-attack models: trust-based an-attack model [7-8] and anonymity-based an-attack 
model [9-10]. How to make good use of peers’ identity privacy became an important 
research basis and the designing mechanism of the both models relates to peers’ 
identity information. In this way we inevitably increase the network’s computational 
overhead and thus they are both difficult to achieve in large complex P2P networks 
such as fully distributed P2P networks [11]. Therefore a peer’s identity information 
can’t be obtained by other peers for considering safety factors. Considering these 
factors above, we need to find other ways to achieve our security and distributed goal 
such as complex network theory [12].   
In this paper, we proposed an anti-attack model based on complex network 
theory in P2P networks: (i) we analyze the characteristics of attack in P2P networks. 
According to our analysis, the type in this kind of networks is progressive attack; (ii) 
we use the PL (Power Low) character of complex network to design a healing 
mechanism. We shift the focus to the study of progressive and rapid attacks on 
networks that can respond in an active fashion. In the process, we design several 
techniques that managed networks can adopt to minimize the damages, and also to 
efficiently recover from the aftermath of successful attacks. We find that the PL nature 
of the networks can be judiciously utilized for such protection and recovery purposes. 
Our simulations show this mechanism can recover the PL exponent of P2P network. 
After that, using generating functions and reverse percolation, we restore connectivity 
of P2P network. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce the anti-attack 
model based on complex networks. In Sec. 3 we show how percolation ideas and 
generating function methods can be used to provide exact solutions of these models 
on simple networks with uncorrelated transmission probabilities. In Sec. 4 we give 
our discussion and conclusions. 
2 Proposed Model Based on Complex Network Theory 
2.1 Notions 
The main notations used in this paper are listed according to their orders in this paper as 
follows. 
α—The exponent of a destroyed P2P network before a healing process. 
β—A stretch factor of the maximum degree in a healing process. 
di—The degree of the peer pi. 
P(d) ,PP’(d) —The degree distribution of a P2P network before and after the healing process. 
d0 , dmax—The maximum of a destroyed P2P network before and after a healing process.  
M(k)—The size distribution of some small components in a restored P2P network. 
N(k)—The degree distribution of the process of a reverse percolation. 
2.2 Basic Model Design 
This section we consider a P2P network where the set of high degree peers is 
removed after being attacked. Then we show how a local healing process can restore 
the maximum degree to an existing cutoff. Each peer decides randomly and 
independently how many preferential edges to insert and in this case the healing 
process doesn’t need any central coordination mechanism.  
We assume a destroyed P2P network’ exponent beαand its maximum degree d0. 
The purpose of the healing process is to increase this maximum degree of the 
distribution by a stretch-factorβ= dmax/d0. Thus the maximum degree after the healing 
process will increase from d0 to dmax while the exponent remains the same. Here each 
peer pi independently decides to compensate with probability f. Next the healing 
process involves making (β-1) di  new preferential connections where di is the 
degree of the peer pi. Let P (d) and PP’ (d) be the degree distributions before and after 
the healing process respectively. In this way we can see that given P(d) is a P2P 
network with maximum degree d  and f =β0 -a and then P’P (d) follows a power-low 
distribution asλ(α,β)d –a whereλis a constant depending onαandβ. Then if the 
degree distribution is power-law to begin with, this healing process will not change 
the distribution. 
Thus, while the attack bounds the maximum degree of the distribution, the 
healing scheme is able to preserve the exponent of the power-low distribution of the 
P2P network. As long as each incoming peer makes n >1 random preferential 
connections, there must exists a giant connected component even for very high rates 
of preferential attacks (see Table 1); thus the loss of connectivity is not one of the 
damaging effects of such attacks. The healing scheme requires two steps as follows: 
Step 1: A new peer p’ is added to the network and makes m preferential 
attachments. 
Step 2: With probability r a preferentially selected peer o is chosen. The 
preferential selection process selects this peer o with degree d (o) and probability d 
(o)/∑i d (i). The selected peer o is then deleted from the network and the deletion 
process is: delete peer o and all its edges. Then o starts as a new peer and makes some 
preferential attachments; for all peers that were connected to o which need to lose an 
edge and each one compensates by adding an edge preferentially. 
We have performed Monte Carlo simulations to validate the results where at each 
step a peer is added and makes n = 2 preferential attachments. Then with probability r 
we delete a peer and choose a peer to be deleted preferentially.  
Table 1: g(r), the scale of peers in the largest connected component for various values of r. 
r 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.2 0.3 
g(r) 1.0 0.997 0.993 0,989 0.983 0.971 
From the table 1, we can see that connectivity of P2P networks is preserved even 
for large values of r. 
2.3 Implementations 
In this section，we briefly introduce a scenario to demonstrate how our model 
works. The scenario we refer to is that we are given a network with a sharp cutoff and 
the peers randomly decide to introduce new edges to restore the cutoff to a desired 
value dmax. Each peer can react whenever it loses an edge unannounced due to an attacked 
neighbor being deleted. Then we use the feedback scheme to proceed to the heeling 
process when the peer encounters the purposed attacks. 
This process includes the following steps. 
(1) Each peer p performs the healing algorithm of Section 2.2 with probability 1/ 
ki when losing an edge, where ki is the degree of the ith peer. 
(2) Neglect the degree correlation of the peers, the probability of any edge being 
deleted when peers of degree greater than k0 are deleted will be given by: 
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Here ξ  is a constant in the order of 1. Then the probability of a peer with 
degree k losing an edge is kP k p≈ . 
(3) We can compute the probability of a peer beginning with the healing process 
is approximately /kP k p=  which depends on the level of the attack. In order to 
simply our focus, we don’t consider second-order effects and degree correlations here. 
As been discussed above, our model is basically designed to detect any 
large-scale deletion of a fraction of network edges. Therefore, the proposed model 
ensures that a certain fraction of the peers will always perform the healing algorithm 
in the case of a large-scale attack.  
2.4 Simulation 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism above, a 
software simulator built from scratch is adopted. Here we have performed the Monte 
Carlo simulations of the healing process, which is used to analyze the classic 
simulation model of complex network. In our simulation design, we use a mesh 
topology with 50000 peers selected randomly. This mesh represents a general 
topology and it can also be applied to specific P2P networks [13]. The simulator relies 
on a discrete time paradigm and the time step is equal to 225 ms.  
To perform the simulation analysis, we adopted the following parameter values. 
For the sake of clarity only ten minutes of the overall simulation is presented. To 
obtain a realistic simulation we limited the available bandwidth. According to the 
application characteristics of P2P networks, the bandwidth is unable to keep a 
sustained speed of 5.00 Mb/s, but rather tends to stabilize around a maximum 2.75 
Mb/s. The movement of all peers was randomly generated with a maximum speed of 
2.50 Mb/s and an average pause of 30s. Each simulation runs 500 simulation seconds. 
The result is shown in Fig. 1~Fig. 3. The vertical axis shows the average degree of the 
component of peers in different value (Log), while the horizontal axis shows the 
number of peers (Log). 
 
 
Fig.1 Degree distribution before and after healing process whenα=2.4 and the 
stretch-factors w from top to down is: w =2, 8, 14, 20, respectively 
 
 
Fig.2 Degree distribution before and after healing process whenα=2.8 and the 
stretch-factors w from top to down is: w =2, 8, 14, 20, respectively 
 
 
Fig.3 Degree distribution before and after healing process whenα=3.2 and the 
stretch-factors w from top to down is: w =2, 8, 14, 20, respectively 
As mentioned above, Fig. 1~Fig. 3 shows that how the healing algorithm works 
for different values ofα. The source P2P network is an attacked network where the 
set of high degree peers is removed after being attacked. In order to restore this kind 
of network, according to the basic model introduced above, we add some preferential 
attachments to heel it. Here we set the number w =2, 8, 14, 20 respectively to compare 
the different heeling effects. Simulation results show that a small number of new 
edges can result in the power-low character of the attacked network being restored 
efficiently in Fig. 1. 
However, this doesn’t mean that our heeling mechanism can work completely 
with the same number of stretch-factors when a power-low P2P network with greater 
exponent in Fig.2 and Fig.3. As we know, a power-low P2P network that has a large 
exponent shows it has some very high degree of peers and if these peers have been 
attacked, the power-low character of the network must be changed immensely. 
Therefore, we can’t add too many random edges to restore because more preferential 
attachments can lead to less real reflection of the attacked network when the 
power-low exponent becomes larger. Then that we set w =14 whenα=2.8 in Fig. 2 is 
a good choice to restore the attacked network, accordingly we set w =8 whenα=3.2 
in Fig. 3.    
3 Restoring connectivity in P2P networks  
In section 2, we introduce that a power-low P2P network will heavily destroyed 
when the set of high degree peers is removed after being a targeted attack. In our 
design above, we insert some new edges randomly and then perform a local heeling 
process to restore the set of high degree peers. However, another question is how to 
restore the connectivity when the attacked network has been heeled and how many 
connections among the peers we need to form a giant connected component in a 
destroyed P2P network.  
Thus our work in this section is to show that how to quick response from a 
targeted attack to restore the connectivity. Besides, we will indicate that a very small 
number of new connections are enough to quickly reconnect most of the broken 
power-low P2P network even under very large-scale targeted attacks. As we know, a 
proof for an attacked power-low P2P network being attacked is difficult to attain and 
then we assume that for a simulating power-low P2P network, the different-scale 
removal of the highest degree peers indeed creates disconnected components with 
different distribution of the size of components. Finally, we indicate that as long as we 
have knowledge about the size distribution with heavy-tailed of components of peers 
and then only a small number of random connections being inserted will connect the 
fragments of components together into a giant connected component. 
3.1 The size distribution of components of peers after attack 
In general, a targeted attack in P2P networks is hard to follow and analyze where 
there are no central mechanism in this kind of network and thus some attacked 
components of peers can’t respond to this incident immediately. However, the 
statistics of the fragmented components of peers after a targeted attack can be 
followed. In this section, according to complex network theory [14][15], we now show 
that the size distribution of the connected components in P2P networks on a given 
degree distribution can be expressed using the generating function forms.  
Now we start by examining attack-percolation process for the general case in 
which occupation probability (the probability of a peer being attacked by some 
malicious peers) is an arbitrary function of the peer degree. Let pk be the probability 
that a randomly chosen peer has degree k, and qk be the probability that a peer is 
attacked provided that it has degree k. Then we can define the generating function 
forms of a destroyed P2P network after a targeted attack as follows: 
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Here dmax is the maximum degree of the peers in the specific simulation sample 
of a P2P network. For the family of PL P2P networks, we assume that the cutoff 
degree of the peers diverges as the maximum degree dmax in the P2P network goes to 
infinity. Therefore the above equations can define the feature of relatively large cutoff 
degree in a PL P2P networks. In particular, if qk decreases with k, it can define a form 
of the targeted attack in effect. Then in our design, we let an attack form for which qk 
=mk-q where q is an analytical parameter of that how targeted the attack is and m is a 
stretch constant. Thus the generating functions of an attacked P2P network after attack 
where an original P2P network with exponentθcan be simply derived as: 
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Where , are both positive constant and'm ''m 3q θ+ > .Especially if the form of an 
attack is the linear targeted attack, the attack parameter q=1 and then we can show 
that the value above is always finite for 2θ > . It can be seen that that such attack will 
in fact increase the value of θ by a certain value q. Therefore following the way of 
Aiello et al. in Ref. [16], we can come to the conclusion that there will be no giant 
connected component of peers in an attacked P2P network if 3.4785cq θ β+ > = . 
However, using the restoring connectivity process in Section 3.2, we can obtain the 
size distribution of the connected component of peers after a targeted attack.   
From what has been discussed above, for an attacked PL P2P network using the 
generating function forms as described above, we can obtain the distribution of the 
fragmented components even if the attacked P2P network might not have any giant 
connected component of peers and the size distribution of the destroyed P2P network 
could still be followed. Next we will discuss how to restore the fragmented P2P 
network to a normal P2P network which has an original giant connected component 
with the same power low and same topological structure. 
3.2 The restoring connectivity process 
In this section, we will make use of percolation theory [17] as the basis of 
restoring connectivity of an attacked P2P network. In this way the destroyed network 
is divided into many small fragments. In the percolation theory, we need to add 
random edges among many small components of the peers in the P2P network. As the 
number of such random links increases to a certain threshold, different components of 
the network must start to bind together until a giant connected component occurs and 
thus these giant connected components contain most of the peers in the attacked 
network. In this way the connectivity process can work as we expect and the specific 
detail can be described as following parts. 
Firstly we let M (k) be the size distribution of these small components and it is 
also the probability of these components that have size k. We can conclude that the 
process corresponds to a percolation on a random graph with degree distribution M(k)
≡N(k).To obtain a random graph with a prescribed degree distribution N (k), we can 
design as follows: for any k, there will be nN (k) peers of degree k in the network, 
arranged as A1k, A2k, A3k... A nP (k)k. Each of these peers creates k dummy duplicate 
peers where the duplicates of the ith peer are expressed as A1,ik, A2,ik, A3,ik,...,A k,ik. Then 
each peer of dummy copies can start a random matching while all the dummy peers 
correspond to a real peer. After the matching, it will collapse the duplicates of a peer 
into its real peer and thus all the links to the duplicates will now be links to the real 
peer itself.  
From what has been discusses above, the process of the restoring connectivity in 
P2P networks can be readily achieved. In the process, any reconnected component can 
be viewed as the duplicate peers of a real peer and the insertion of random edges can 
be showed as a percolation process whose degree distribution is equal to the 
distribution of the component sizes of the real broken components. In the usual 
percolation process, keep each edge with probability p which in the random graph 
construction process, basically involves doing random matching with probability p in 
the network with duplicated peers. With this correspondence, many of the well-known 
results for the percolation process on random graphs with a given degree distribution 
can be readily applied to the restoring process. 
In our design, the percolation threshold for the probability of successful attempts 
required for a giant component to appear can be calculated as: qc =<C>/(<C2>－<C>2 ) 
where <C>，<C2> are the average and variance of the distribution of the connected 
components[8]. While the average size of the connected components in an attacked 
P2P network is finite and therefore it is possible for the variance of this distribution to 
be very large. In this way, the corresponding percolation threshold will be small. In 
particular, if the distribution of the size of the connected components follows a 
power-low distribution with exponent 2.4<θ<3.7 and the maximum component size 
Cmax》1.2. Thus we are sure that most of the disconnected components are reconnected 
and the connectivity of the broken network can be restored. 
 
4 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed an anti-attack model based on complex network 
theory in P2P networks. It can restore the maximum degree and topological structure 
in a local healing manner, and restore the connectivity after a P2P network being 
attacked. Therefore our research provides one way on the dealing with attacks in P2P 
networks and it can ensure P2P network’s communication security and robustness. 
However, the mechanism proposed in the paper only considering a single kind of 
P2P networks that does not interact and depends on other kinds of P2P networks to 
avoid attackers. In reality, there are many interdependent P2P networks interacting 
with each other. To enhance the our design here, in future work, we will introduce 
other mechanisms such as the robustness of different kinds of networks [18] for 
studying interacting P2P networks and will present an exact anti-attack model for a 
single P2P network of n interdependent P2P networks. In this way, our model can be 
optimized. 
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